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Location, Quality and Choice of Hospital:  
Evidence from England 2002-2013 
 
Giuseppe Moscelli1,2       Luigi Siciliani3     Nils Gutacker1        Hugh Gravelle1 
 
Abstract 
 
We investigate (a) how patient choice of hospital for elective hip replacement is influenced 
by distance, quality and waiting times, (b) differences in choices between patients in urban 
and rural locations, (c) WKH UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQKRVSLWDOV¶elasticities of demand to quality 
and the number of local rivals, and how these changed after relaxation of constraints on 
hospital choice in England in 2006. Using a data set on over 500,000 elective hip replacement 
patients over the period 2002 to 2013 we find that patients became more likely to travel to a 
provider with higher quality or lower waiting times, the proportion of patients bypassing their 
nearest provider increased from 25% to almost 50%, and hospital elasticity of demand with 
respect to own quality increased. By 2013 average hospital demand elasticity with respect to 
readmission rates and waiting times were 0.2 and 0.04.   Providers facing more rivals had 
demand that was more elastic with respect to quality and waiting times. Patients from rural 
areas have smaller disutility from distance.  
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1 Introduction 
 
+HDOWKFDUHUHIRUPVH[WHQGLQJWKHSDWLHQW¶VULJKW WRFKRRVHa provider for hospital care have 
been introduced in several OECD countries during the last two decades (Vrangbaek et al, 
2012). Reducing constraints on choice for planned (non-emergency) healthcare is intended, 
inter alia, to incentivize hospitals to compete on quality (Besley and Ghatak, 2003), 
especially in those systems where prices for healthcare are regulated (Gaynor, 2006). It is 
hoped that with fewer constraints on patient choice of provider, hospitals with higher quality 
can attract more demand and raise revenues, whereas those with poor quality may lose 
revenues. However, the success of this incentive mechanism depends crucially on whether 
patients and demand respond to hospital quality. 
 
In the English National Health Service (NHS) before 2006 the choice of hospitals for elective 
hospital treatment was generally constrained to the set of local NHS hospitals which had 
contracts with the SDWLHQW¶VORFDOKHDOWKDXWKRULW\. In 2006 constraints on choice of provider 
were relaxed with patients having to be offered a choice of at least 4 providers and from 2008 
they could choose from any qualified providers wherever located.  
 
Using data from 2002/3 to 2012/13 on choice of hospital for elective hip replacement we 
address three research questions related to the understanding demand-side mechanisms in 
healthcare: (a) how do distance, quality and waiting times influence choice of hospital, (b) do 
these factors have different effects on the choices of patients in rural and urban areas, and (c) 
KRZGRHVDKRVSLWDO¶Velasticity of demand with respect to its quality vary with the number of 
rivals.  We use data over a long period to investigate how the answers to these questions 
changed over time, especially after the relaxation of constraints on hospital choice in 2006.    
 
These questions have obvious policy relevance. If hospital demand is not responsive to 
quality then relaxation of constraints on choice is unlikely to stimulate hospital competition 
via quality. Wider choice sets may contain providers who yield higher utility to patients.  But 
this benefit may be greater in urban areas where patients will have more local providers, 
whereas rural patients with longer distances to travel to providers may gain less and may 
change their demands less in response to quality. If demand is more responsive to quality for 
hospital with more rivals, quality may be higher in more competitive areas and lower in less 
competitive ones.  
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We estimate models of hospital choice for elective hip replacement and focus on two 
dimensions of quality: procedure specific clinical quality and waiting times. The most 
common adverse outcome after hip replacement surgery is an emergency readmission within 
28 days. In addition to emergency readmission rates we also measure clinical quality by rates 
of revisions within a year of discharge and mortality rates within 28 days of discharge.  
 
We find that patients value quality when choosing their preferred provider of care, especially 
after relaxation of constraints on choice. Specifically, we find that hospitals with higher 
readmission rates were less likely to be chosen in the years after 2006, while this was not the 
case in earlier years.  Revision rates did not have a consistent effect on choice. Hospitals with 
long waiting times attracted fewer patients, but only after 2008, while hospitals with higher 
mortality rates were less likely to be chosen throughout the entire period. As with previous 
studies, we find distance to be a strong predictor of choice, with patients preferring hospitals 
close from home. 
 
Marginal utilities for quality are similar for urban and rural patients from 2006 onwards. 
Marginal disutility of distance did not change much over the period but was smaller for rural 
patients.   
 
After the introduction of choice policies, the average demand elasticity to readmission rates 
varied between -0.07 and -0.25.  The average demand elasticity to waiting times was about 
0.04 after 2007.  Patients are willing to travel 0.5 additional kilometres to avoid an increase 
of one standard deviation in emergency readmissions.  Hospital demand is more elastic with 
respect to own quality the larger the number of rivals and the effect of having more rivals 
became greater in later years. 
 
Section 2 provides background by way of short review of the relevant literature and a 
description of the institutional framework. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 sets out the 
methods and Section 5 has the results. Section 6 concludes. 
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2 Background 
 
2.1 Related literature 
 
Our study contributes to the small but growing literature on hospital choice and how it relates 
to quality (see Brekke et al. (2014) for a review). In the US, Luft et al (1990) find that 
hospitals with poorer than expected mortality or complication rates attracted significantly 
fewer admissions. Similar results are obtained by Hodgkin (1996) and Tay (2003) using 
health outcomes for patients with cardiac conditions, Howard (2005) using graft failure rate 
one year following kidney transplantation, and Pope (2009) using hospital quality rankings. 
Several studies have also investigated the effect of releasing hospital quality information on 
patient choice and health outcomes. Wang et al (2011) show that the publication of report 
cards decreased the probability of receiving CABG surgery by poorly performing surgeons. 
Using Italian data from Lombardy, Moscone et al (2011) find that the presence of social 
interactions across patients who are in lack of official information to rate hospitals may 
mislead patients in choosing lower providers of care.     
 
Three recent studies are from England. Gaynor et al (2012) investigates the introduction of 
choice policies in England for patients in need of a coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) 
using data for 15 months before (January 2004 to March 2005) and 15 months after (January 
2007 to March 2008). They find that patients are responsive to quality, and that the 
LQWURGXFWLRQ RI KRVSLWDO FKRLFH OHG WR D UHGXFWLRQ LQ PRUWDOLW\ DQG WR LQFUHDVHG SDWLHQWV¶
welfare. The market for hip replacement is very different from that for CABG.  The number 
of hip replacements has increased over time whereas CABG demand has fallen.4 The market 
for hip replacement is less concentrated: CABG surgery is highly specialised and provided by 
only 30 hospitals. Hip replacements are performed in most hospitals in England and the 
market has grown substantially over time from 187 providers in 2002/3 to 297 in 2012/13 as 
a result of the entry of private providers. The mortality risks of the two procedures also differ: 
30-day mortality after non-emergency CABG is 1.17%, compared with non-emergency hip 
replacement mortality of 0.35%.   
 
Beckert et al (2012) use English data for elective hip replacement for 2009/10 and measure 
hospital quality by overall hospital mortality, MRSA infection rates, hip replacement waiting 
times and numbers of doctors and nurses.  In keeping with the broader literature on hospital 
                                                 
4
 Hip replacements increased by 30% over our period compared with a reduction of 20% in CABG. 
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choice, they find that patients are responsive to quality. By contrast we use condition specific 
clinical quality measures (post-operative emergency readmissions, revision rates, and 
mortality rates).  Moreover, we investigate how demand responsiveness has changed over a 
ten-year period before and after relaxation of constraints on choice.  
 
Gutacker et al (2015) analyse choice of provider for elective hip replacement surgery in the 
English NHS between 2009 and 2013 making use of newly available data on patient reported 
outcomes (PROMs) and find that using PROMs in addition to conventional quality measures 
such as revision and readmission rates improves predictions of hospital choice. Since PROMs 
data are only available from April 2009, we use the conventional measures to examine 
choices before and after relaxation of constraints on choice.  
 
The literature on rural and urban hospitals is mainly US focused and has mostly investigated 
differences in quality of urban/rural hospitals (Adams et al, 1991; Goody, 1993; Ferrier and 
Valdmanis, 1996; Baldwin et al, 2004). Differences in choice of healthcare provider and 
targeting of rural patients have been investigated by Tai et al (2004) and Roh et al (2008). 
7KHVH VWXGLHV IRFXV RQ WKH HIIHFW RI SDWLHQWV¶ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV HJ DJH FRPRUELGLWLHV SDVW
medical utilisation) and organization characteristics (e.g. volume, type of hospitals, number 
of beds, ownership status) on demand for rural hospitals. Conversely, we focus on differences 
in choices (and preferences) between urban and rural patients.  
 
 
2.2 Institutional background 
 
The England NHS is funded by taxation and free to patients at point of use. Local purchasing 
bodies receive budgets from the Department of Health to contract healthcare provision for 
their resident populations from primary care and hospital providers.5 As part of the re-
introduction of the internal market (Dixon et al, 2010), prospective payment for hospitals was 
rolled out incrementally from April 2003 onwards, so that increasingly money followed the 
patient (Farrar et al, 2009).  Previously, health authorities negotiated block contracts with 
their local providers under which the provider agreed to treat fixed number of patients in 
return for a fixed sum, with some adjustment to the payment if the number treated differed 
from the contracted number.  Choice was not entirely constrained. In principle GPs could 
refer patients to other providers who would then be remunerated per patient but this was not 
                                                 
5
 The English local purchasing authorities are Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) until April 2013, after which they 
have been replaced by Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs). 
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encouraged by health authorities. In 2002/3 the average practice referred patients to over 7 
different providers over all types of elective care (Dusheiko et al, 2008). Private independent 
sector providers (ISPs) were allowed to enter the NHS market for planned care from 2003 
onwards; until then only public NHS hospitals could provide inpatient care.6  
 
In 2006, patients were given the right to choose from at least 4 providers of non-emergency 
care; and from 2008 they could choose any qualified provider wherever located.  An 
electronic booking system (Choose and Book) was introduced in 2005/6 to allow direct 
booking of referrals from general practices. By 2012/13, 50% of all referrals were made via 
the system (Dusheiko and Gravelle, 2015). Since 2007 the NHS Choices website has 
provided public information on the location, services and quality of providers.  
 
 
3 Data 
 
We use individual level data from Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) on all elective 
admissions for NHS-funded elective primary (i.e. non-revision) hip replacement surgery 
between April 2002 and March 2013 in English NHS and privately-operated hospitals for 
patients aged 18 and over.7 We exclude privately-funded patients treated in NHS hospitals 
(13,087, or 2.21% of the HES initial sample). We drop hospitals with less than 50 elective hip 
replacement patients in a given year to reduce noise in our quality measures. The average 
hospital volume in our estimation sample is 307 patients. 
 
Patient usual place of residence is reported at Lower Super Output Area (LSOA).8 Each 
LSOA contains approximately 1,500 inhabitants and is designed to be homogeneous with 
respect to tenure and accommodation type.  We use ONS definitions of urban and rural 
LSOAs to attach an indicator of rurality to patients.9  We also attach a measure of income 
deprivation to each patient by their LSOA using the 2004 Indices of Multiple Deprivation. 
 
                                                 
6
 By 2010/11, private providers treated 4% of NHS elective patients, concentrating on a small number of high 
volume procedures such as hip replacements (Hawkes, 2014). 
7
 We exclude patients undergoing a revision surgery because these patients are expected to be more likely to 
return to the hospital of initial hip replacement surgery, independently of observed hospital quality. We use the 
hip replacement procedure codes from Department of Health (2008). 
8
 As our sample span from 2002 to early 2013, we use LSOA defined according to 2001 census boundaries by 
the English Office for National Statistics (ONS). There were 32,482 LSOA in England according to this 
definition.  
9
 The rural category encompasses the grouping of areas classified as town and fringe, village, hamlet and 
isolated dwellings, while the urban category consist just of urban areas. See ONS (2004) for details.  
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We compute straight-line distances using geographical coordinates of the centroid of 
SDWLHQWV¶ /62$ RI UHVLGHQFH DQG WKH ORFDWLRQs of all hospitals providing hip replacement 
surgery in a given year.10 The choice set for each patient is defined as the 30 providers closest 
WR WKHFHQWURLGRI WKHSDWLHQW¶V/62$RIUHVLGHQFH:HH[FOXGH,589 NHS-funded patients 
(0.96%) who choose a provider outside this choice set. 
 
We measure hospital quality with three clinical indicators specific to elective hip replacement 
patients:  28-day emergency readmissions following discharge; one-year revisions rates 
following surgery; and mortality rates within 28 days of discharge. All rates are adjusted for 
case-mix differences using the approach prescribed by the Health & Social Care Information 
Centre (2013a). Emergency readmissions rates are associated with lower quality of care 
(Weissman et al, 1999) and are commonly used as measure of quality, both internationally 
(Ashton et al, 2007;  Balla et al, 2008) and in England (Billings et al, 2012; Blunt et al, 2014).  
 
:DLWLQJ WLPHV DUH OLNHO\ WR LQIOXHQFH SDWLHQWV¶ FKRLFH RI KRVSLWDO 9DUNHYLVVHU HW DO 2007; 
Sivey, 2012; Gaynor et al, 2012; Ruwaard and Douven, 2014) since they postpone benefits 
DQGSDWLHQWV¶KHDOWK VWDWXVPD\GHWHULRUDWHZKLOHZDLWLQJ $SSOHE\HW DO2XGKRII HW
al., 2007). We therefore also measure mean waiting time for hip replacement at a provider as 
the average time elapsed from the date the specialist adds a patient to the waiting list to the 
date of hospital admission for surgery.   
 
We distinguish between NHS and independent sector (ie private) providers (ISPs) and also 
group NHS providers into five categories used by the National Patient Safety Agency: NHS 
small and multi-service, medium, large non-teaching trust, NHS teaching trust, and NHS 
specialised orthopaedic provider. This allows for the possibility that choice of provider may 
be influenced by unobservable characteristics associated with provider type.11 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Hospital location is based on the postcode of the headquarters of NHS trusts and the postcode of the hospital 
site for independent sector providers (ISPs). We use NHS hospital headquarters instead of the hospital site since: 
NHS produced quality information is defined and measured at trust level, NHS sites belonging to a same trust 
are typically clustered together and over 91% of elective hip replacement operations in NHS providers are 
performed in a single site.  Private providers are often part of hospital chains which have more geographically 
scattered sites, so that LSOA to site distance is more appropriate for private providers.  
11
 Note that the size classification of NHS providers is not affected by the number of hip replacement patients as 
it is based on the total number of all patients (emergency and elective) and availability of services, and does not 
vary over time.  
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4 Methods 
 
4.1 Model specification 
 
The empirical analysis is based on the conditional logit random utility model (McFadden, 
1974). Utility of patient 1,...,i N  receiving care at provider 1,...,j J at time 1,...,t T  is  
      ijt ijt jt ijtU V [ H                (1) 
where ijtV  depends on observed hospital characteristics, such as quality, and travel distance, 
jt[ is utility from unobserved hospital characteristics and ijtH is the unobserved random error 
term. Each patient i  has a choice set itM J .  If the error term ijtH is distributed as an i.i.d. 
extreme value, the probability of patient i  choosing hospital j , given that they have decided 
to have a hip replacement in the NHS, is 
     1' '
'
exp   exp   
it
ijt ijt jt ij t j t
j M
P V V[ [


ª º  « »¬ ¼¦            (2) 
 
The estimated coefficients in a conditional logit model are identified only up to a common 
scale parameter that depends on the unobserved variance of the random error term ijtH  (Train, 
2003). To be able to compare marginal utilities of quality and distance across different years, 
we estimate a pooled model for all patients across all years interacting observable hospital 
characteristics and distance with year dummies.12  
 
We assume that utility of patient i in year t who chooses hospital j of type g is 
     
K K S K N M Sq q s qx d x s
ijt kt gkt kt jkt st ijt kmt jkt imt s ijt imt ijtk k s k i m sU q q d q x d xD E G E G H     ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦     
           = ( ) ( )q q d qx dxgt t jt t t t jt it t t it t ijtHc c c      q Į T ȕ G ȕ T [ ȕ G [ ȕ                     (3) 
where   is the Kronecker product. 
 
jktq  is the kth quality measure (emergency readmissions, revisions, mortality, waiting times) 
in provider j in year t. gktq = /gtN jkt gtj g q N¦  is the mean of the kth quality characteristic in 
                                                 
12
 Interacting year indicators with hospital quality and waiting times ensures that estimated marginal utilities and 
elasticities in a given year are driven only by the hospital metrics in that same year and are not confounded by 
variation in other years.      
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hospitals of type g in year t.13 We include gktq in the specification to allow for the unobserved 
provider effects jt[ .14 
 
s
ijtd  is the s¶WK power of the distance dijt from the centroid of the LSOA of residence of patient 
i to provider j in year t.  We found that a cubic distance specification had better fit than linear 
or quadratic specifications but adding further powers of distance did not yield further 
improvements.  
 
mx = 
1
imtt i
N x ¦ ¦  is the average the m¶th individual characteristic (the mean for age, 
measures of severity and deprivation and the mode for gender) over all patients in all years 
and imtx  = imtx  mx .   We thus allow for patient characteristics to affect the marginal utility 
of provider quality and distance.  By interacting the deviations of patient characteristics from 
their averages we can interpret the coefficients qktE , dstE  as the marginal utilities with respect 
to quality and powers of distance of a reference patient with average characteristics in a given 
year.   
 
Information on hospital quality indicators is typically available to patients with a time lag of 
approximately one year, so patients are assumed to respond to past rather than current 
information on quality when choosing providers.  For this reason, provider qualities qjkt and 
provider type qualities gktq  (emergency readmissions, revisions, mortality, and waiting times) 
are measured with a one-year lag.15  
                                                 
13
 There are six hospital types: private, large NHS, medium NHS, small/multiservice NHS, teaching NHS, 
specialist NHS, with the reference category being large (non-teaching) NHS hospitals. 
14
 The model in Eq. (3) is analogous to Mundlak (1978) correction to control for unobserved heterogeneity. In 
our sample, we have an unbalanced panel of hospitals of different types. This might lead to estimation bias due 
to time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity caused by differences in quality across hospital types, as well as 
time-varying unobserved heterogeneity due to the entry and exit of hospitals of different types. Private hospitals 
entered the market after 2006 and DUHFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\DOHVVFRPSOH[SDWLHQWV¶FDVH-mix and by lower waiting 
times than NHS hospitals. Similarly, specialist NHS orthopaedic hospitals have a more complex case-mix than 
non-specialist ones. The inclusion of gktq , the quality characteristic in hospitals of type g in year t, allows us to 
control for both the unobserved heterogeneity due to the unobserved differences in hospital types across the 
years and the possible sample selection bias of the estimates of quality and waiting times due to the unbalanced 
structure of the panel. We also considered richer specifications with interactions of provider type with year 
dummies to allow the effect of hospital type to vary over time. However it was not possible to compute 
coefficients or standard errors for these interaction terms.  
15
 This approach is similar to Beukers et al (2014) and Gutacker et al (2015). Hospitals may learn by doing so 
that higher volume providers have higher quality. A study with English 1997-2002 hip replacement data found 
that 30-day in-hospital mortality was higher in low volume hospitals that treated less than 100 patients per year 
but found no volume effect above this threshold (Judge et al, 2006). A more recent study (Varagunam, 2015) 
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To investigate differences in preferences between urban and rural patients and how these 
have evolved over time we also estimate a model assuming that 
   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )q q d qx dx qR dRijt gt t jt t t t jt it t t it t jt ijt t t ijt t ijtU R R Hc c c c c         q Į T ȕ G ȕ T [ ȕ G [ ȕ T ȕ G ȕ   (4) 
where iR  is an indicator function equal to 1 when the patient resides in an LSOA classified as 
rural.  Thus the marginal utilities of quality and distance for rural patients with reference 
personal characteristics are q qRkt ktE E  and d dRst stE E .  
 
 
4.2 Willingness to travel and demand elasticity 
 
Since the utility function (1) is unique only up to a linear transformation, estimated 
coefficients convey information only about the sign of marginal utility and of the effect of 
quality on demand.  However, the ratio of estimated marginal utilities (i.e. the negative of the 
marginal rate of substitution) is unaffected by linear transformations and hence provides 
quantitative information about patient preferences which is comparable across different years 
and different types of patient. 
 
From (3) willingness to travel (WTT) of the representative patient in year t for a one standard 
deviation increase in the k¶WKquality measure (Vk) is 
 2
1 2 3
/
/ 2 3
ijt
q
ijt ijt jkt kt
kt k k k d d d
jkt ijt ijt t t d t dU
d U q
WTT
q U d
EV V V E E P E P
§ ·w w w     ¨ ¸¨ ¸w w w  © ¹
    (5)  
where dP is the average distance to the chosen provider for all patients over all years. The 
GHOWDPHWKRGLVXVHGWRFRPSXWHWKH:77V¶Vtandard errors (Hole, 2007). ktWTT  is the change 
in distance to the chosen hospital that the average patient in year t requires to offset a one 
standard deviation increase in qjkt.   
 
Note that in the usual consumer setting, where utility depends on goods with positive 
marginal utility, the marginal rate of substitution between two good is negative: it is the 
amount of one good the individual would be willing to give up in exchange for one unit of 
another good.  If the quality measures had positive marginal utility and distance has negative 
marginal utility then WTT would be positive: it would be the extra distance the patient would 
                                                                                                                                                        
using better data on quality reported no relationship between hospital volume and quality. Using lagged quality 
data further reduces the risk of simultaneity bias.  
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be willing to travel to a hospital with higher quality. But if, as seems plausible, the quality 
measures qjkt (emergency readmission rates, revision rates, mortality rates, waiting times) and 
distance have negative marginal utility, then WTT would be negative. It would be the 
reduction in distance to a provider required to offset the increase in qjkt.   
 
We also compute provider elasticity of demand with respect to qjkt and the percentage 
demand change from a one standard deviation increase in own quality. Expected demand at 
provider j  is 
jtjt ijti C
Y P ¦  where Cjt is the set of patients whose choice sets include 
provider j  (j  Mit). Following Santos et al (2015), the elasticity of demand of provider j to 
its quality qjkt is  
 1jt
jt
jt
Y jt jkt jktq
jkt kt ijt ijti C
jkt jt ijti C
Y q q
E P P
q Y P
E

w  w ¦ ¦           (6) 
We report the mean of (6) weighted by predicted provider demand jtY .  
 
The percentage change in hospital demand for a kV increase in qkt (semi-elasticity) is  
   1% 100 100 1
jt jtjkt k
jtk qk
jt kt ijt ijt k ijti C i Cq
jkt jt
Y
Y P P P
q YV
V E V  '  
w ª º ª º'  u  u « » « »¬ ¼ ¬ ¼w ¦ ¦         (7) 
We investigate the relationship between semi-elasticities and market structure by plotting the 
estimates of % kjtY'  against the number of rival providers within a radius of 30 km.  
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5 Results 
 
5.1 Summary statistics 
 
Table 1 has summary statistics on patient characteristics and their hospital choices.  Patients 
are elderly (average age 68) and 60% are female. Around 1/8th have had an emergency 
admission in the year before their hip replacement and nearly a third suffer from 
comorbidities when admitted.   Just over a quarter live in rural LSOAs. 
 
On average patients can choose from over 7 hospitals within 30km and over 15 within 50km. 
The average distance to their chosen hospital was 13km.  Two thirds chose their nearest 
hospital but one third did not, travelling an additional 3.5km to their chosen hospital.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 2002/3 ± 2012/13 
Patient characteristics Mean SD Min Max 
Age 67.95 11.36 18 103 
Male  0.40 0.49 0 1 
Emergency admissions in year prior to admission 0.13 0.56 0 211 
Number of Elixhauser comorbitidies  0.32 0.8 0 13 
IMD income 2004 (score) 0.13 0.1 0 0.96 
Resident in urban LSOA 0.73 0.44 0 1 
Availability of hospitals     
Average number of hospitals within 10km 1.37 1.75 0 15 
Average number of hospitals within 30km 7.35 7.23 0 33 
Average number of hospitals within 50km 15.55 11.85 0 51 
Choice of hospital     
Distance to chosen hospital (km) 13.37 13.51 0 292.36 
Proportion of patients bypassing closest hospital 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Excess distance travelled over closest hospital 3.54 9.41 0 266.04 
Proportion of patients treated in private hospitals 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Notes.  Number of observations is 546,474. 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the marked changes in clinical quality and waiting times over the period.  
Note that, as we assume that patients observed quality and waiting time with a one year lag, 
we show the lagged values against the years for which they are relevant. For example, we 
plot 2001/2 readmissions against 2002/3 which is the year in which choices influenced by 
2001/2 readmission rates were made.  Lagged emergency readmission rates increased 
between 2002/3 and 2007/8 and then declined.  Lagged revision rates fell from 2006/7 
onwards and had halved by 2012/13.  Lagged mortality after hip replacement declined over 
13 
 
the period.16  There was a large decrease in waiting times over the period from nearly 9 
months to under 3 months. 
 
Figure 2 shows the increasing numbers of patients treated over the period.  The total number 
increased by 65.5% with a larger increase (83.8%) for rural than for urban (59.5%).  There 
was a substantial increase in the number of NHS hip replacement patients treated in private 
hospitals from zero in 2002/3 to over 20% in 2012/13. 
 
 
Figure 1. Trends in one year lagged clinical quality and waiting times 2002/3 to 2012/13 
 
Note.  We plot one-year lagged values against years. For example the lagged readmission rate plotted against 
2002/3 is the readmission rate for 2001/2 as we assume that choices in year t are based on quality and waiting 
times in year t1. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Mortality after elective hip replacement is a rare event. The average standardized 28-days mortality rate is 
particularly low in the later years of our sample. The estimation results presented below are robust to the 
exclusion of hospital standardized 28-days mortality rate. Results are available upon request.     
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Figure 2.  Trends in patients treated by urbanicity and hospital ownership  
 
 
 
Figure 3 plots the trends in choices made by patients.  In panel (a) we see that the rural 
patients travelled about twice as far to their chosen provider as urban patients. Despite the 
increase in the number of providers, due to the entry of private sector ISPs, the average 
distance to the chosen provider was constant over the period.  Panel (b) shows that rural 
patients were more likely to bypass their nearest provider than urban patients.  The proportion 
of both rural and urban patients bypassing their nearest provider increased steadily and by 
20012/13 was 55% for rural patients and 45% for urban patients.   Panels (c) and (d) show the 
how the proportion of patients choosing their nth closest provider has changed between 
2002/3 and 2012/13.   
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Figure 3.  Distance and choice of provider 2002/3 to 2012/13 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Estimation results 
 
Table 2 gives selected coefficients from models which include a cubic function of distance 
and patient characteristics interacted with distance.  Model 1 only has distance and patient 
characteristics interacted with distance.  Model 2 is specification (3) which adds quality 
variables and patient characteristics interacted with quality to model 1. Model 3 is 
specification (4) which adds further interactions with patient rurality.  Although most of the 
explanatory power is due to distance, the pseudo R2 increases as quality and waiting time are 
added to the model and there are considerable improvements in the two information criteria 
goodness of fit measures.  
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Table 2. Estimates of marginal utilities  
  (1) distance  (2) distance & quality (3) distance, quality, rurality 
          urban patients rural interactions 
  
Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t 
distance (baseline) -0.351 -92.048 -0.3675 -92.144 -0.3842 -94.01 0.088 14.19 
2003 * distance 0.0697 15.718 0.0786 17.005 0.0755 15.522 -0.0229 -3.149 
2004 * distance 0.0256 5.084 0.0279 5.298 0.0334 6.164 -0.02 -2.524 
2005 * distance 0.0307 6.416 0.0365 7.33 0.0097 1.762 0.0487 6 
2006 * distance 0.0232 4.712 0.0339 6.671 0.0419 8.109 -0.0204 -2.743 
2007 * distance 0.0417 8.467 0.0467 9.091 0.0428 7.957 0.0115 1.387 
2008 * distance 0.0641 13.617 0.0714 14.617 0.0668 12.819 -0.0012 -0.152 
2009 * distance 0.0609 12.886 0.0694 14.148 0.0681 13.484 -0.0162 -2.185 
2010 * distance 0.0688 14.708 0.0771 15.842 0.0697 13.594 0.0036 0.46 
2011 * distance 0.0742 16.31 0.0841 17.79 0.0729 14.318 0.0045 0.592 
2012 * distance 0.0706 15.453 0.0806 16.943 0.0775 15.432 -0.0103 -1.343 
readmissions (baseline) 
    
0.0502 10.487 0.0468 8.849 0.0127 1.498 
2003 * readmissions 
    
-0.063 -8.968 -0.0831 -10.677 0.0655 5.267 
2004 * readmissions 
    
-0.0425 -5.852 -0.0502 -6.226 0.0115 0.91 
2005 * readmissions 
    
-0.0519 -8.103 -0.0453 -6.396 -0.0217 -1.879 
2006 * readmissions 
    
-0.0363 -5.472 -0.0328 -4.45 -0.0173 -1.482 
2007 * readmissions 
    
-0.0962 -15.237 -0.1137 -16.16 0.056 5.047 
2008 * readmissions 
    
-0.0709 -11.731 -0.0705 -10.471 -0.0042 -0.388 
2009 * readmissions 
    
-0.0761 -12.154 -0.0868 -12.473 0.0296 2.686 
2010 * readmissions 
    
-0.125 -19.998 -0.1211 -17.443 -0.0196 -1.765 
2011 * readmissions 
    
-0.1185 -19.507 -0.1316 -19.436 0.0403 3.78 
2012 * readmissions 
    
-0.107 -17.742 -0.1089 -16.258 0.0046 0.438 
waiting times (baseline) 
    
0.0014 0.266 -0.0112 -1.943 0.0592 6.278 
2003 * waiting times 
    
-0.0145 -2.027 -0.0153 -1.983 0.0019 0.148 
2004 * waiting times 
    
-0.0086 -1.027 -0.0143 -1.586 0.0183 1.201 
2005 * waiting times 
    
0.0626 6.595 0.0564 5.424 0.0222 1.327 
2006 * waiting times 
    
0.1172 10.837 0.1152 9.683 0.0057 0.302 
2007 * waiting times 
    
0.0632 5.411 0.0572 4.348 0.0131 0.658 
2008 * waiting times 
    
-0.046 -4.757 -0.0369 -3.364 -0.0462 -2.841 
2009 * waiting times 
    
-0.0177 -1.341 -0.0234 -1.56 0.0079 0.359 
2010 * waiting times 
    
0.002 0.206 0.0284 2.63 -0.1058 -6.384 
2011 * waiting times 
    
-0.0522 -4.013 -0.0319 -2.214 -0.0842 -3.692 
2012 * waiting times 
    
-0.0239 -2.122 -0.0105 -0.84 -0.0567 -2.857 
revisions  (baseline) 
    
-0.0817 -6.628 -0.0797 -6.021 -0.043 -1.877 
2003 * revisions 
    
0.1732 10.776 0.155 8.929 0.0825 2.735 
2004 * revisions 
    
0.0143 0.964 -0.0196 -1.226 0.186 6.627 
2005 * revisions 
    
0.0707 4.704 0.0514 3.142 0.1113 4.002 
2006 * revisions 
    
0.084 5.624 0.0581 3.604 0.1288 4.556 
2007 * revisions 
    
0.1288 7.825 0.117 6.523 0.0837 2.795 
2008 * revisions 
    
0.0233 1.485 -0.007 -0.411 0.1311 4.55 
2009 * revisions 
    
0.0544 3.156 -0.0041 -0.215 0.2373 7.556 
2010 * revisions 
    
0.027 1.55 0.0002 0.01 0.1498 4.66 
2011 * revisions 
    
0.1412 9.065 0.1389 8.166 0.0508 1.791 
2012 * revisions 
    
0.0982 6.178 0.0802 4.618 0.1004 3.478 
mortality (baseline) 
    
-0.1335 -5.186 -0.1096 -3.912 -0.1079 -2.311 
2003 * deaths 
    
0.02 0.593 0.0517 1.414 -0.1524 -2.423 
2004 * deaths 
    
-0.0176 -0.519 -0.0472 -1.277 0.1429 2.278 
2005 * deaths 
    
-0.1901 -5.2 -0.2264 -5.661 0.1137 1.705 
2006 * deaths 
    
-0.077 -2.155 -0.2445 -6.183 0.6332 9.896 
2007 * deaths 
    
-0.1876 -5.13 -0.1808 -4.508 0.0013 0.02 
2008 * deaths 
    
-0.2923 -7.272 -0.3122 -7.1 0.1195 1.6 
2009 * deaths 
    
-0.0085 -0.223 -0.0525 -1.245 0.173 2.527 
2010 * deaths 
    
0.2848 7.745 0.2555 6.298 0.1203 1.8 
2011 * deaths 
    
0.0705 1.688 0.1117 2.438 -0.1506 -1.981 
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2012 * deaths 
    
-0.0098 -0.207 0.157 2.963 -0.491 -5.925 
Pseudo R^2 0.6583 0.6746 0.6759 
AIC 1270578 1210694 1205984 
BIC 1273471 1218088 1214503 
Notes. All models also contain distance squared, distance cubed, interactions of patient characteristics with 
distance, distance squared, distance cubed, all interacted with year. Models 2 and 3 also contain average quality 
of provider type and interactions of patient characteristics with quality, all interacted with year. 
 
 
 
5.3 Marginal utility and willingness to travel 
 
Unsurprisingly the marginal utility of distance is negative but less so as distance increases. 
Figure 4 plots marginal utility of distance against distance ( 21 2 32 3d d dt t d t dE E P E P  ) for 2004/5 
and 2008/9 for all patients, urban patients and rural patients where Pd is the mean distance to 
the chosen provider for the relevant patient type over all years.  Figure 5 has the estimated 
marginal utilities of distance in each year for all patients, urban patients and rural patients.  
 
Figure 4. Marginal utilities of distance in 2004/5 and 2008/9. 
 
 
Note. Marginal utility of distance is 21 2 32 3
d d d
t t d t dE E P E P   where Pd is the mean distance to chosen provider for 
each patient type over all years and the coefficients on the powers of distance are for the representative patient 
with average personal characteristics. Coefficients for all patients are from model (2) and for rural and urban 
patients from model (3). Vertical lines show the average distance to the chosen provider for: all patients (solid); 
urban (short dashed); rural (long dashed). 
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The coefficients on distance and quality measures are for the representative patient with 
average characteristics.17 Figure 5 plots these coefficients of the marginal utilities of distance 
for different years and shows that rural patients have a smaller marginal disutility of distance 
than urban patients and that marginal disutility did not change greatly over the period.  
 
Figure 5. Trends in marginal utility of distance 
Note. Marginal utility of distance is 21 2 32 3
d d d
t t d t dE E P E P   where Pd is the mean distance to chosen provider for 
each patient type over all years and the coefficients on the powers of distance are for the representative patient 
with average personal characteristics.  Coefficients for all patients are from model (2) and for rural and urban 
patients from model (3). 
 
 
Figure 6 shows the estimated marginal rates of substitution (5) between distance and the 
quality measures (WTT). Given the temporal stability of the marginal utilities of distance, 
variations over time in WTT are mainly due to changes in the marginal utilities of quality and 
waiting times. The plotted WTT are the change (reduction) in distance required to 
compensate for a one standard deviation in increase in emergency readmission rates, revision 
rates, mortality rates, and waiting times. Since emergency readmissions either had a positive 
                                                 
17
 The interactions of quality and distance with patient characteristics are not the key focus of this analysis and 
are therefore not reported. They show that older and sicker patients have more negative marginal utility from 
distance, and distance has less negative marginal utility for more deprived patients. Moreover, gender had little 
effect on preferences for quality and, more surprisingly, nor does morbidity. 
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or zero marginal utility up to 2006 but had an increasingly negative marginal utility 
thereafter, the emergency readmissions rate WTT was initially around zero but increased 
from 2007/8 onwards. The mortality rate WTT grew up to 2008/9 and then decreased.  Up to 
2004/5 waiting times had a small negative marginal disutility. From 2005/6 to 2007/8 patients 
became more likely to choose hospitals with longer waiting times, and thereafter they were 
less likely to choose hospitals with longer waits.  There was no consistent trend in the 
estimated marginal utilities and hence WTT for revision rates. Instead, they do not seem to 
consistently respond to one-year revision rates.  
 
Figure 6. Willingness to travel (WTT) for one standard deviation increase in quality and 
waiting time  
 
 
 
The results suggest the effect of readmission rates, mortality, and waiting times changed after 
the relaxation of constraints on patient choice in 2006 and 2008. From 2008 patients were 
willing to travel 0.5 additional kilometres to avoid an increase of one standard deviation in 
emergency readmissions and 0.25 additional kilometres to avoid an increase of one standard 
deviation in waiting times.  
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5.4 WTT of urban and rural patients 
 
The WTT for urban and rural patients are shown in Figure 7. Rural patients have a smaller 
marginal disutility from distance than urban patients. The marginal disutility for mortality is 
similar for urban and rural patients in most years up to 2011/12 except for 2006/7. Up to 
2008/9 rural patients had a positive marginal utility for waiting time.   Urban patients dislike 
1-year revisions in most years while this is not the case for rural patients.  Urban patients 
dislike emergency readmissions more than rural patients in most of the recent years. 
 
Figure 7. Willingness to travel for a standard deviation increase in quality for urban 
and rural patients  
 
 
There are no systematic differences in the WTT for waiting times after 2008/9. There are also 
no systematic differences in WTT to avoid higher mortality except for the more recent years. 
In the last year (2012/13) rural patients are willing to travel 1 kilometre more than urban 
patients to avoid a one standard deviation increase in elective hip replacement mortality rates. 
Despite the higher disutility from travelling, urban patients are willing to travel further (up to 
1 km in 2009) than rural ones to avoid increases in revisions after surgery. There are similar 
differences in all the years, except for 2002/3.  
 
21 
 
The marginal utility for readmission rates was positive for rural patients in the pre-choice 
years before 2005. Similarly, the marginal utility for waiting times was positive for rural 
patients before 2007. It is unlikely that patients prefer high emergency readmissions or long 
waits. We interpret these counterintuitive results as evidence that hospital choice was 
constrained, i.e. patients were effectively allocated to hospitals, and that rural patients were 
the most penalized by such constraints to hospital choice.  
 
 
5.5 HospitalV¶ demand elasticity to quality  
 
Table 3 reports the elasticity of demand with respect to own quality (6) for each year 
averaged across all hospitals. Although demand responds to quality after the introduction of 
choice policy, it was relatively inelastic. In years after 2008 the mean demand elasticity with 
respect to emergency readmissions is 0.17 and with respect to waiting time it is 0.04. 
Demand also responds to mortality rates, though less so in later years, and across the whole 
period the demand elasticity is 0.03.  
 
Table 3. Average hospital demand elasticities with respect to own quality by year  
Year Readmissions Mean waiting time Revisions Mortality 
2002 0.124 0.005 -0.06 -0.027 
2003 -0.037 -0.051 0.077 -0.026 
2004 0.022 -0.023 -0.067 -0.033 
2005 -0.005 0.179 -0.01 -0.06 
2006 0.044 0.295 0.002 -0.043 
2007 -0.156 0.148 0.035 -0.043 
2008 -0.066 -0.086 -0.039 -0.057 
2009 -0.082 -0.023 -0.016 -0.017 
2010 -0.254 0.005 -0.029 0.02 
2011 -0.23 -0.078 0.034 -0.005 
2012 -0.201 -0.038 0.009 -0.009 
Note. Elasticities are computed from model (2). 
 
 
 
 
5.6 Semi-elasticities and number of rival hospitals 
 
Figure 7 plots the percentage change in demand for each hospital resulting from  1 SD 
increases in readmission, mortality and revision rates, and waiting times (semi-elasticity (7)) 
against the number of competing hospitals within 30 km radius of each provider. It shows the 
extent to which hospitals facing more competitors have a more elastic demand. We compare 
two years, 2004/5 and 2008/09, before and after relaxation of constraints on choice.  
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Figure 8(a) shows that in 2004/5 semi-elasticities with respect to emergency readmissions 
were positive (on average equal to 0.8%). The correlation between semi-elasticity of demand 
and number of rival hospitals was positive and significant (at 5%). In contrast, in 2008/9 the 
semi-elasticities with respect to emergency readmissions were negative (on average equal to -
2.5%, varying between -0.35% and -4.8%) and negatively correlated with the number of rival 
hospitals. This suggests that after the introduction of choice, hospital demand responded to 
quality and the percentage demand change was larger for hospitals facing more potential 
competitors. The effect of additional rivals seems modest. In 2008/9, a hospital with 5 rivals 
had a predicted semi-elasticity of 2%, whereas a hospital with twice as many rivals (10 
rivals) has a predicted semi-elasticity of 2.44%.  
 
Figure 8(b) shows in 2004/5 semi-elasticities with respect to waiting times are negative but 
small (on average -0.87%). In 2008/9, the semi-elasticities with respect to waiting times are 
greater absolutely (on average equal to -6%, and varying between -0.84% and -11.4%), and 
negatively correlated with the number of rivals hospitals. In 2008/9 one additional rival 
increases absolutely the semi-elasticity of demand by almost a fifth.  
 
The patterns of semi-elasticities with respect to mortality in Figure 8(d) are qualitatively 
similar to those for waiting times. In 2004/5 they are negative but small. In 2008/9, the semi-
elasticities with respect to mortality vary between -1.18% and -16% and additional rivals lead 
to a bigger change in the semi-elasticity. The semi-elasticities with respect to revisions are 
negatively associated with the number of rivals (Figure 8(c)) but with a similar pattern in 
2004/5 and 2008/9 (full results are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix). 
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Figure 8. Percentage demand change from a standard deviation increase in own quality and number of rivals  
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6 Conclusions 
 
We have investigated changes in the responsiveness of demand to quality following the 
introduction of the new internal market from 2002/3 onwards and in particular the relaxation 
of constraints on patient choice from 2006 onwards. Consistently with previous literature we 
find that distance is the main predictor of hospital choice. Before 2006 demand was 
sometimes higher for providers with worse quality or longer waiting times ± a finding we 
interpret as suggesting that patient choices were indeed constrained. After 2006 these patterns 
disappear and we find that patients preferred, on average, providers with lower waiting times, 
emergency readmissions rates, and mortality rates. 
 
Although hospitals with higher quality, ceteris paribus, attract more patients, the estimated 
demand elasticities are generally 0.2 or less. With an average NHS tariff for hip replacement 
in 2012/13 of £5866 this implies that, for example, a reduction in the emergency readmission 
rate of one standard deviation would increase the number of hip replacement patients in an 
average provide by 24.4, yielding a revenue increase £143,000.  However, additional patients 
impose additional costs and increasing quality by one standard deviation will also be costly. 
 
Hospital demand is more responsive to quality for providers facing more rivals. Although the 
result is intuitive, the increase in responsiveness seems quite small. For example in 2012/13, 
hospitals with ten additional rivals have demand semi-elasticity with respect to readmission 
rates by which are more negative by -1.2%.  
 
Compared with urban patients, rural patients do not seem to have very different preferences 
with respect to quality, except for revision rates (and readmission rates in recent years), 
which are generally found to be disliked more by urban than by rural patients.  In contrast, 
rural patients are less averse to distances and travel further to their chosen provider.  
Although marginal disutility from travel is lower, the total disutility of travel is higher for 
rural patients.  There seems to be scope for choice policies to be further refined and to 
stimulate patients to choose providers based on quality.  Surveys of patients suggest that only 
around 2/3rd are aware of their right to a choice and that around 50% report being offered a 
choice (Dixon, 2010). There may be required policies which encourage further dissemination 
and use of information on quality.  Other possibilities include subsidising travel expenses for 
patients bypassing local hospitals, as in Norway (Askildsen et al, 2013). The cost of 
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interventions aimed at further stimulating competition need however to be traded-off with the 
opportunity cost of introducing alternative policies aimed at improving quality, such as 
monitoring and auditing, and pay-for-performance schemes.  Our study compares demand 
responsiveness to quality before and after the introduction of choice policies. One possible 
OLPLWDWLRQLVWKDWVRPHRIWKHVHFKDQJHVDUHGXHDOVRWRFKDQJHVLQSDWLHQWV¶SUHIHUHQFHVRYHU
time and technological progress, as evidenced by improved health outcomes.   
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Appendix A.      
 
Table A1. Linear regression of hospital semi-elasticities estimates (from Eq. 7) on number of 
rival hospitals within 30km. 
 
Quality measure Year OLS Coefficient 95% C.I. Bounds 
Readmissions 2002 0.2394 [0.2209, 0.2578] 
Readmissions 2003 -0.0609 [-0.0657, -0.0560] 
Readmissions 2004 0.0338 [0.0302, 0.0373] 
Readmissions 2005 -0.0075 [-0.0083, -0.0067] 
Readmissions 2006 0.0625 [0.0569, 0.0681] 
Readmissions 2007 -0.1883 [-0.2057, -0.1709] 
Readmissions 2008 -0.0869 [-0.0936, -0.0802] 
Readmissions 2009 -0.0864 [-0.0962, -0.0765] 
Readmissions 2010 -0.2087 [-0.2335, -0.1838] 
Readmissions 2011 -0.1424 [-0.1658, -0.1190] 
Readmissions 2012 -0.1228 [-0.1461, -0.0995] 
Waiting Times 2002 0.0075 [0.0069, 0.0081] 
Waiting Times 2003 -0.0687 [-0.0742, -0.0632] 
Waiting Times 2004 -0.0349 [-0.0386, -0.0313] 
Waiting Times 2005 0.3083 [0.2755, 0.3411] 
Waiting Times 2006 0.5947 [0.5415, 0.6479] 
Waiting Times 2007 0.2934 [0.2663, 0.3205] 
Waiting Times 2008 -0.2072 [-0.2231, -0.1912] 
Waiting Times 2009 -0.0601 [-0.0670, -0.0533] 
Waiting Times 2010 0.0107 [0.0094, 0.0120] 
Waiting Times 2011 -0.1174 [-0.1368, -0.0981] 
Waiting Times 2012 -0.0540 [-0.0642, -0.0437] 
Revisions 2002 -0.1705 [-0.1837, -0.1573] 
Revisions 2003 0.1896 [0.1745, 0.2047] 
Revisions 2004 -0.1295 [-0.1432, -0.1159] 
Revisions 2005 -0.0207 [-0.0229, -0.0185] 
Revisions 2006 0.0046 [0.0042, 0.0051] 
Revisions 2007 0.0844 [0.0766, 0.0922] 
Revisions 2008 -0.1069 [-0.1152, -0.0987] 
Revisions 2009 -0.0397 [-0.0443, -0.0352] 
Revisions 2010 -0.0667 [-0.0747, -0.0588] 
Revisions 2011 0.0543 [0.0453, 0.0632] 
Revisions 2012 0.0156 [0.0127, 0.0186] 
Mortality 2002 -0.1041 [-0.1121, -0.0960] 
Mortality 2003 -0.0878 [-0.0948, -0.0808] 
Mortality 2004 -0.1085 [-0.1199, -0.0971] 
Mortality 2005 -0.2293 [-0.2537, -0.2049] 
Mortality 2006 -0.1553 [-0.1692, -0.1414] 
Mortality 2007 -0.2146 [-0.2345, -0.1948] 
Mortality 2008 -0.2914 [-0.3138, -0.2689] 
Mortality 2009 -0.0773 [-0.0861, -0.0685] 
Mortality 2010 0.0690 [0.0608, 0.0772] 
Mortality 2011 -0.0214 [-0.0250, -0.0179] 
Mortality 2012 -0.0506 [-0.0602, -0.0410] 
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Figure A1. Marginal utilities of quality, waiting time and distance 
 
 
Figure A2. Marginal utilities of quality, waiting time and distance for urban and rural 
patients
 
